

## Message Text

SECRET

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51

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W  
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P R 051420Z AUG 75

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2687  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 269

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PARM  
SUBJECT: STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON AND GENERAL ROWNY,  
AUGUST 5, 1975 (SALT TWO - 711)

THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON  
AND GENERAL ROWNY AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF AUGUST 8, 1975.

QUOTE

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

AUGUST 5, 1975

MR. MINISTER:

I

TODAY I WANT TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO BAN THE  
DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS FOR PLACING  
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER KIND OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUC-

TION INTO ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH.

II

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THIS PROPOSAL AS WELL AS THE RATIONALE FORWARDED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN SUPPORT OF IT DURING OUR PAST MEETINGS. AS A RESULT, THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER INCLUSION OF SUCH A PROPOSAL IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT IF IT IS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE ANY PRESENT AND FUTURE FRACTIONAL ORBITAL BOMBARDMENT SYSTEM (FOBS).

IN THE INTEREST OF MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD ON THIS ISSUE, THE UNITED STATES PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING DRAFT LANGUAGE FOR ARTICLE X:

"EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY SYSTEMS FOR PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER KIND OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO ORBIT OR FRACTIONAL ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH."

IN OFFERING THIS PROPOSAL, I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS THAT ANY OBLIGATION NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY A SYSTEM INCLUDES AN OBLIGATION TO DISMANTLE OR DESTROY ANY SUCH SYSTEM ALREADY DEPLOYED.

MR. MINISTER, I BELIEVE THAT THIS INITIATIVE BY THE U.S. SIDE IS A CONSTRUCTIVE STEP IN THE WORKING OUT OF A JOINT DRAFT TEXT FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT.

III

MR. MINISTER, LATER IN OUR MEETING I WILL ASK GENERAL ROWNY TO RESPOND TO THE STATEMENTS GIVEN ON JULY 29, 1975, BY SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE II OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT. IN FUTURE MEETINGS WE WILL BE DISCUSSING OTHER DEFINITIONS CONTAINED IN THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE II.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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P R 051420Z AUG 75

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2688  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 269

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QUOTE

STATEMENT BY GENERAL ROWNY

AUGUST 5, 1975

MR. MINISTER,

I

I AM PLEASED TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE SOVIET STATEMENTS OF JULY 29. WE WELCOME THE SOVIET AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE THE RANGE OF 5500 KILOMETERS IN THE ICBM DESCRIPTION. THERE IS STILL, HOWEVER, A DIFFERENCE IN OUR APPROACH TO THE DEFINITIONS INVOLVING ICBMS AND SLBMS. THE US HAS DEFINED BOTH AN ICBM AND ITS LAUNCHER WHEREAS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS TO DEFINE ONLY A LAUNCHER. HOWEVER, BOTH THE US AND SOVIET DEFINITIONS FOCUS ON A DESCRIPTION OF AN ICBM ITSELF. NEITHER DEFINITION DESCRIBES THE SIZE, SHAPE, CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, OR ANY OTHER PHYSICAL QUALITY OF THE LAUNCHER ITSELF. IN ADDITION, BOTH DEFINITIONS TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE SINGLE

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QUALITY THAT DISTINGUISHES AN ICBM LAUNCHER FROM ANY OTHER MISSILE LAUNCHER--THAT IS, ITS ABILITY TO LAUNCH AN ICBM. THEREFORE, IT CONTINUES TO BE OUR VIEW THAT IT IS BOTH LOGICAL AND DESIRABLE TO DEFINE BOTH AN ICBM AND AN ICBM LAUNCHER.

II

TURNING TO THE SLBM DEFINITION, THE RATIONALE FOR DEFINING BOTH THE MISSILE AND THE LAUNCHER WHICH I HAVE JUST DISCUSSED APPLIES TO SLBMS AS WELL. WITH REGARD TO THAT PORTION OF THE DEFINITION WHICH DEALS WITH THE MISSILE ITSELF, WE BELIEVE

THAT THE US LANGUAGE MAKES CLEAR THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT INCLUDES ALL OF THE SLBMS LIMITED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

III

TURNING NOW TO HEAVY BOMBERS, WE NOTE THAT THERE IS AGREEMENT THAT COUNTING ANY FUTURE BOMBER IN THE 2400 AGGREGATE WILL BE MADE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS BY COMPARING THAT BOMBER WITH OTHER BOMBERS ALREADY INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE. IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT WE UNDERSTAND HOW SUCH COMPARISONS WILL BE MADE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PRINCIPAL CRITERION FOR SUCH COMPARISONS SHOULD BE THE BOMBER'S CAPABILITY. AMONG THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS WHICH DETERMINE THIS CAPABILITY ARE THE FACTORS OF PAYLOAD AND INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE.

SUCH A COMPARISON CAN BE MADE IN THE CASE OF BACKFIRE. IT HAS RANGE/PAYLOAD CAPABILITIES COMPARABLE TO THOSE OF AIRCRAFT WHICH BOTH SIDES AGREE ARE HEAVY BOMBERS. DATA AVAILABLE FROM NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS INDICATE THAT BACKFIRE, UNREFUELED, CAN CARRY A PAYLOAD OF ABOUT 10 METRIC TONS TO A RANGE OF 10,000 KILOMETERS.

IN ITS JULY 29 DISCUSSION, THE SOVIET DELEGATION ASSERTED THAT THE US POSITION ON BACKFIRE WAS BASED IN PART ON ITS AIR REFUELING CAPABILITY. I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE COMPARISONS I HAVE JUST MADE SHOW THAT BACKFIRE'S UNREFUELED RANGE/PAYLOAD CAPABILITY IS COMPARABLE TO THAT OF BOMBERS THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED TO COUNT IN THE 2400 AGGREGATE.

IF ONE WERE TO COMPARE THE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF BACKFIRE WITH THOSE OF OTHER HEAVY BOMBERS, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE NOTED THAT THE BACKFIRE IS NOT AN UPGRADED VERSION OF AN OLDER AIRCRAFT. THE BACKFIRE IS A NEW GENERATION AIRCRAFT. TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS SUCH AS ADVANCED FUSELAGE DESIGNS, VARIABLE GEOMETRY WINGS, LIGHTER MATERIALS, AND IMPROVED ENGINES, PERMIT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SMALLER HEAVY BOMBERS WITH CAPABILITIES EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN THOSE OF OLDER DESIGN HEAVY BOMBERS CURRENTLY IN SERVICE. THEREFORE, THE TREND IN HEAVY BOMBERS IS TOWARD SMALLER SIZE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE BACKFIRE IS APPROXIMATELY 20 PERCENT SMALLER AND LIGHTER IN WEIGHT THAN THE BISON, AND SIMILARLY, THE B-1 IS APPROXIMATELY 20 PERCENT SMALLER AND LIGHTER IN WEIGHT THAN THE B-52.

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IN SUMMARY, BASED ON THE COMPARISON WHICH I HAVE PRESENTED TODAY, UNQUESTIONABLY THE BACKFIRE MUST BE CONSIDERED A HEAVY BOMBER.

IV

TURNING NOW TO THE MIRV DEFINITIONS, A COMPARISON OF THE US FORMULATION CONTAINED IN THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT AND THE SOVIET FORMULATION TABLED ON JULY 9, 1975, INDICATES THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE COINCIDENCE OF VIEWS ON THOSE FACTORS WHICH DISTINGUISH A MIRV SYSTEM. WE APPEAR TO AGREE: (1) THAT A MIRV SYSTEM CONTAINS MORE THAN ONE REENTRY VEHICLE; (2) THAT EACH REENTRY VEHICLE MUST BE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE, AND ACCORDINGLY, MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH NON-INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES (MIRVS) ARE NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN THE MIRV LIMITATION. THE PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCE IN THE APPROACH OF OUR TWO DEFINITIONS STEMS FROM THE EXPLANATION OF THE TERM "IN-DEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE". THE SOVIET DEFINITION SEEKS TO DESCRIBE HOW INDEPENDENT TARGETING COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED, BUT DOES NOT SPECIFY WHAT "INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE" ACTUALLY MEANS. IN CONTRAST, THE US FORMULATION DEFINES INDEPENDENT TARGETING. THE US DEFINITION STRESSES THAT EACH REENTRY VEHICLE CAN HAVE AN AIM POINT INDEPENDENT OF THE AIM POINT OF ANY OTHER REENTRY VEHICLE OR VEHICLES DISPENSED FROM THE SAME MISSILE. IN OUR VIEW, THIS BEST DESCRIBES THE TERM - MIRV.

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JOHNSON

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## Message Attributes

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